



# **How To Present Evidence In Debate Rounds**



# Intro

- This is a PowerPoint derived from the DebateDrills Academy course “How to Cut a Card.”
- To see more (including a video), check it out [here](#).



## **Example Resolution and Affirmative**

- Resolved: The United States ought not provide military aid to authoritarian regimes
- Affirmative: The United States ought not provide military aid to Saudi Arabia.
  - Disclaimer: There's a debate as to whether Saudi Arabia is an authoritarian regime.

**We present  
evidence using  
“cards”**



- Definition: (this is a made up term but this is the debate definition)
  - It's the evidence you read in a round to support your position
- 3 components:
  - Tagline (“tag”)
  - Citation (“cite”)
  - Article text





# Tag

- Definition:
  - It's the summary of the evidence you'll be reading

# Tag - Example 1



**No interoperability means Saudis can't switch – they're too invested in US weapons.**

Emmons' 15 (Emmons, Alex - Alex is a reporter covering national security, foreign affairs, human rights, and politics. Prior to joining The Intercept, he worked for Amnesty International and the American Civil Liberties Union on their campaigns against targeted killing, mass surveillance, and Guantánamo Bay. "SECRET REPORT REVEALS SAUDI INCOMPETENCE AND WIDESPREAD USE OF U.S. WEAPONS IN YEMEN." The Intercept, April 14, 2019. <https://theintercept.com/2019/04/15/saudi-weapons-yemen-us-france/>. JJN)

But **a highly classified document** produced by the French Directorate of Military Intelligence **shows that Saudi Arabia** and the United Arab Emirates **are overwhelmingly dependent on Western-produced weapon systems to wage their devastating war in Yemen.** Many of the **systems** listed **are only compatible with** munitions, spare parts, and communications systems produced in **NATO countries**, meaning that the **Saudis** and UAE would have to replace large portions of their arsenals to continue with Russian or Chinese weapons. **You can't just swap out the missiles that are used in U.S. planes for suddenly using Chinese and Russian missiles.** said Rachel Stohl, managing director of the Conventional Defense Program at the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. **It takes decades to build your air force. It's not something you do in one fell swoop."** The Saudi-led bombing campaign in North Yemen primarily relies on three types of aircraft: American F-15s, British EF-2000 Typhoons, and European Tornado fighters. The Saudis fly American Apache and Black Hawk helicopters into Yemen from military bases in Saudi Arabia, as well as the French AS-532 Cougar. They have lined the Saudi-Yemen border with American Abrams and French AMX 30 tanks, reinforced by at least five types of Western-made artillery guns. And the coalition blockade, which is aimed at cutting off aid to the Houthi rebels but has also interfered with humanitarian aid shipments, relies on U.S., French, and German models of attack ships with, as well as two types of French naval helicopters.

# Tag - Example 2



**Saudi reliance on the US means the defense relationship continues post-plan.**

Omar '17 (Mohammed, Omar - MA Candidate in Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. "The Special Partnership: Considering U.S.-Saudi Relations Through the Alliance Politics Literature." UOttawa, September 11, 2017. <https://ruor.uottawa.ca/handle/10393/36607>. JJN

3.3 U.S.-Saudi Dependency Linkages **The U.S.'s long history of arms transfers to Saudi Arabia highlights the latter's dependence on the U.S. as a security patron. The nature of the dependency, characterized by a Saudi military primarily equipped and trained by U.S. expertise, underscores an unbalanced relationship** in which the patron benefits from **extensive security links** which **cannot be easily replaced**. Although Saudi Arabia engages a variety of states for its arms procurement, **the U.S. has consistently remained at the top of its preferred partners.** Both the United Kingdom and France have long supplied Saudi Arabia with arms, however as U.S. allies, their role can be better understood as a supplementary one. As early as 1973, the U.S. and the U.K. collaborated on arms deals with Saudi Arabia to reach deals that benefit both states interests.<sup>48</sup> More significantly both France and the U.K do not possess the ability or the political will to project their power in the Middle East, in a manner that would present a legitimate alternative to the U.S.'s current role. Saudi Arabia has also engaged international actors outside of the Western sphere for the purchase of military armaments. Saudi Arabia's defence ties with China are the most significant in this arena. Saudi Arabia's secret purchase of intercontinental ballistic missiles from China, following a Congressional rejection of a similar deal, lead to U.S. concern that it would seek an arms patron outside of the existing partnership.<sup>49</sup> Saudi Arabia's arms acquisitions from China have continued in recent years with a purchase of an upgraded version of the Chinese ballistic missile in 2013. Nonetheless, despite Saudi Arabia's willingness to diversify its arms expenditure, **its ties with China do not pose a serious abandonment threat** as described Snyder. While **China** has increased its share of the global arms export market in recent years, it **continues to lag significantly behind the U.S** (see Figure 1). The wide gap in military spending between Saudi Arabia and the U.S., estimated to have reached \$50 billion in arms purchase in 2015, and Saudi Arabia and China, where total spending reached an estimated \$700 million dollars illustrates the former's extensive reliance on U.S arms. <sup>50</sup> As a result, Saudi Arabia's negotiating power within the frame of the partnership is significantly constrained. Alliance politics literature posits that clients must be able to credibly threaten alternatives to influence patron behaviour. In Saudi Arabia's case public displays to indicate its ability to seek alternative partners such as visits by Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman to China and Russia, carry less credible weight. While Saudi Arabia possesses the purchasing power to acquire military armament from any international suitor, **its military is heavily integrated into American security systems, training, and upkeep.** Gene Gerzhoy underscores this dependence by noting that **Saudi Arabia's existing U.S. military stock is largely not interoperable with other weapons systems and requires U.S. technical expertise to remain operational**<sup>52</sup>. Furthermore, Gerzhoy argues that Saudi Arabia's military dependency on U.S. arms and expertise is so extensive, that **a break in U.S. military assistance would cripple the capabilities of the Saudi armed forces**<sup>53</sup>. This highlights the imbalance between the credibility of political threats made by the two partners. Although Saudi Arabia has been vocal in threatening the possibility of seeking alternatives to its U.S. partnership, through media interlocutors and diplomatic actions, its ability to do so limited by existing military realities. **Saudi Arabia's ability to seek an alternative security guarantee is also limited by the U.S.'s ongoing military presence throughout the Gulf region.** As it stands, **no international state actor possesses the ability to replace the U.S.'s military presence in the region. While U.S. troops have not maintained a physical presence in Saudi Arabia** since their post-Gulf War withdrawal in 1997, **they continue to maintain a significant presence in neighbouring Gulf countries** where the U.S. has negotiated bilateral military cooperation agreements. For example, **Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet while Qatar is the forward headquarters of** the U.S. Central Command (**CENTCOM**) **as well as the U.S.'s Al-Udeid airbase** (see Figure 2). **There are an estimated 35,000 active duty U.S. troops stationed at bases in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the U.A.E.** Although the U.S. has withdrawn its active military presence from **Saudi Arabia**, it **continues to receive security benefits from each of the surrounding U.S. military installations.** In addition, **U.S. naval patrol of the waters surrounding Saudi Arabia**, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, **help protect Saudi maritime interests from potential Iranian naval aggression.**



# Tag - Example 3



**The war in Yemen has devastated women's rights movements and they disproportionately suffer from the fallout.**

Wadekar '18 (Wadekar, Neha. "Women Want to Put Yemen Back Together Again." Foreign Policy, November 27, 2018. <https://foreignpolicy-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/2018/11/27/women-want-to-put-yemen-back-together-again/>. JJN

Yemen's conflict began when the Houthis, an Iranian-backed rebel group, swept down and seized control of much of the country in protest against widespread corruption and abuse in the administration of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In March 2015, a coalition of states led by Saudi Arabia and supported by the United States intervened to reclaim Yemen on behalf of the internationally recognized government. Both sides have been accused of committing atrocities against Yemen's civilian population. **The effect on women has been devastating.** In 2011, inspired by the Arab Spring, many women took to the streets to reclaim their rights after nearly three decades of increasingly conservative politics and growing fundamentalist ideological influences that eroded the status of women and girls in Yemen. They used the momentum of that movement and leveraged new political leadership vying to build a modern state, aiming to secure a minimum quota of 30 percent women's representation in the Yemeni legislature and a commitment to including language about women's equality and rights in the new constitution. But **when the war started in 2015, activist women quickly realized that the 30 percent quota they had worked so hard to achieve would not be honored, and that wartime conditions would more than reverse all the previous progress that had been made. The guns basically took over the space, and the international community also marginalized the women,**" said Sanam Anderlini, founder of the International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN), an organization dedicated to promoting women's rights, peace, and human security in countries affected by conflict. In a typical recent scene in Aden, under the blazing sun, Yemeni widows dressed head to toe in long, black abayas, their faces covered with full niqabs, were holding out small bowls in hopes of getting a few Yemeni rials from sympathetic passersby, who themselves have little to offer. As inflation rises, **little girls are being pulled out of school and married off to provide dowry money to feed their starving families. Rates of gender-based and sexual violence are also increasing as the conflict escalates, according** to an August report from the U.N. Population Fund; an estimated **3 million Yemeni women and girls are at risk of gender-based violence. Women and children comprise about three-quarters of Yemen's 3 million displaced people, and are "paying the heaviest price** as in most humanitarian crises."



## Cite

- Definition: it's the place where you give the author credit for the work and state where you got the evidence from



## Format

- This isn't your AP US History paper
- Judges don't care if periods and commas are in the right place or if it's MLA or Chicago format
- BUT you NEED to give proper credit and reference important information (like qualifications) that will help you in round

## **Cite components**

- Last name of author, year  
(you read this out loud)
- Full name of author and  
qualifications
- Article title in quotations
- Publication
- Date
- URL
- Your initials (optional)



# Cite - Example 1



**No interoperability means Saudis can't switch – they're too invested in US weapons.**

**Emmons '19** (Emmons, Alex - Alex is a reporter covering national security, foreign affairs, human rights, and politics. Prior to joining The Intercept, he worked for Amnesty International and the American Civil Liberties Union on their campaigns against targeted killing, mass surveillance, and Guantánamo Bay. "SECRET REPORT REVEALS SAUDI INCOMPETENCE AND WIDESPREAD USE OF U.S. WEAPONS IN YEMEN." The Intercept, April 14, 2019. <https://theintercept.com/2019/04/15/saudi-weapons-yemen-us-france/>. JJN)

But **a highly classified document** produced by the French Directorate of Military Intelligence **shows that Saudi Arabia** and the United Arab Emirates **are overwhelmingly dependent on Western-produced weapon systems to wage their devastating war in Yemen.** Many of the **systems** listed **are only compatible with** munitions, spare parts, and communications systems produced in **NATO countries**, meaning that the **Saudis** and UAE would have to replace large portions of their arsenals to continue with Russian or Chinese weapons. **You can't just swap out the missiles that are used in U.S. planes for suddenly using Chinese and Russian missiles.**" said Rachel Stohl, managing director of the Conventional Defense Program at the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. **"It takes decades to build your air force. It's not something you do in one fell swoop."** The **Saudi-led bombing campaign in North Yemen primarily relies on three types of aircraft: American F-15s, British EF-2000 Typhoons, and European Tornado fighters. The Saudis fly American Apache and Black Hawk helicopters into Yemen from military bases in Saudi Arabia, as well as the French AS-532 Cougar.** They have lined the Saudi-Yemen border with American Abrams and French AMX 30 tanks, reinforced by at least five types of Western-made artillery guns. And the coalition blockade, which is aimed at cutting off aid to the Houthi rebels but has also interfered with humanitarian aid shipments, relies on U.S., French, and German models of attack ships with, as well as two types of French naval helicopters.



# Cite - Example 2



**Saudi reliance on the US means the defense relationship continues post-plan.**

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3.3 U.S.-Saudi Dependency Linkages **The U.S.'s long history of arms transfers to Saudi Arabia highlights the latter's dependence on the U.S. as a security patron. The nature of the dependency, characterized by a Saudi military primarily equipped and trained by U.S. expertise, underscores an unbalanced relationship** in which the patron benefits from **extensive security links** which **cannot be easily replaced**. Although Saudi Arabia engages a variety of states for its arms procurement, **the U.S. has consistently remained at the top of its preferred partners.** Both the United Kingdom and France have long supplied Saudi Arabia with arms, however as U.S. allies, their role can be better understood as a supplementary one. As early as 1973, the U.S. and the U.K. collaborated on arms deals with Saudi Arabia to reach deals that benefit both states interests.<sup>48</sup> More significantly both France and the U.K. do not possess the ability or the political will to project their power in the Middle East, in a manner that would present a legitimate alternative to the U.S.'s current role. Saudi Arabia has also engaged international actors outside of the Western sphere for the purchase of military armaments. Saudi Arabia's defence ties with China are the most significant in this arena. Saudi Arabia's secret purchase of intercontinental ballistic missiles from China, following a Congressional rejection of a similar deal, lead to U.S. concern that it would seek an arms patron outside of the existing partnership.<sup>49</sup> Saudi Arabia's arms acquisitions from China have continued in recent years with a purchase of an upgraded version of the Chinese ballistic missile in 2013. Nonetheless, despite Saudi Arabia's willingness to diversify its arms expenditure, **its ties with China do not pose a serious abandonment threat** as described Snyder. While **China** has increased its share of the global arms export market in recent years, it **continues to lag significantly behind the U.S.** (see Figure 1). The wide gap in military spending between Saudi Arabia and the U.S., estimated to have reached \$50 billion in arms purchase in 2015, and Saudi Arabia and China, where total spending reached an estimated \$700 million dollars illustrates the former's extensive reliance on U.S. arms.<sup>50</sup> As a result, Saudi Arabia's negotiating power within the frame of the partnership is significantly constrained. Alliance politics literature posits that clients must be able to credibly threaten alternatives to influence patron behaviour. In Saudi Arabia's case public displays to indicate its ability to seek alternative partners such as visits by Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman to China and Russia, carry less credible weight. While Saudi Arabia possesses the purchasing power to acquire military armament from any international suitor, **its military is heavily integrated into American security systems, training, and upkeep.** Gene Gerzhoy underscores this dependence by noting that **Saudi Arabia's existing U.S. military stock is largely not interoperable with other weapons systems and requires U.S. technical expertise to remain operational**<sup>52</sup>. Furthermore, Gerzhoy argues that Saudi Arabia's military dependency on U.S. arms and expertise is so extensive, that **a break in U.S. military assistance would cripple the capabilities of the Saudi armed forces**<sup>53</sup>. This highlights the imbalance between the credibility of political threats made by the two partners. 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For example, **Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet while Qatar is the forward headquarters of** the U.S. Central Command (**CENTCOM**) **as well as the U.S.'s Al-Udeid airbase** (see Figure 2). **There are an estimated 35,000 active duty U.S. troops stationed at bases in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the U.A.E.** Although the U.S. has withdrawn its active military presence from **Saudi Arabia**, it **continues to receive security benefits from each of the surrounding U.S. military installations.** In addition, **U.S. naval patrol of the waters surrounding Saudi Arabia**, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, **help protect Saudi maritime interests from potential Iranian naval aggression.**



**Article text**

- Definition: this should be fairly self-explanatory but it's the actual text of the article that you attained



# Format

- 3 components
  - Highlighted text: what you read out loud
  - Underlined text: everything that is relevant/potentially important from the article
  - Shrunk text: everything that is not relevant/not potentially important to make your point (optional)

## KEY Notes



- You have to take full paragraphs from the article (you cannot take part of a paragraph, start in the middle of the paragraph, etc)
- You do NOT have to take the full article
- You must include every single word from the paragraphs (you cannot modify the author's words)



# Text - Example 1



**No interoperability means Saudis can't switch – they're too invested in US weapons.**

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# Text - Example 2



## Saudi reliance on the US means the defense relationship continues post-plan.

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## **Conclusion Slide**

- A card has 3 parts: the tagline, citation and article text
- How you format a card is up to you, but remember to follow the general guidelines in this course!

**Thank you for watching!**